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GRAPH DISTANCES FOR DETERMINING ENTITIES
RELATIONSHIPS: A TOPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO
FRAUD DETECTION
J.M. CALABUIG, H. FALCIANI, A. FERRER-SAPENA, L.M. GARCI´A-RAFFI AND
E.A. SA´NCHEZ-PE´REZ
Abstract. Given a set Ω and a proximity function φ : Ω × Ω → R+,
we define a new metric for Ω by considering a path distance in Ω, that
is considered as a complete graph. We analyze the properties of such a
distance, and several procedures for defining the initial proximity matrix
(φ(a, b))(a,b)∈Ω×Ω. Our motivation has its roots in the current interest in
finding effective algorithms for detecting and classifying relations among
elements of a social network. For example, the analysis of a set of compa-
nies working for a given public administration or other figures in which
automatic fraud detection systems are needed. Using this formalism,
we state our main idea regarding fraud detection, that is founded in the
fact that fraud can be detected because it produces a meaningful local
change of density in the metric space defined in this way.
1. Introduction
The great increase in relations between financial actors due to the wide-
spread use of social networks has opened the door to a new form of social
organization, which can generate solid and powerful structures for commit-
ting financial fraud. In parallel, the development of the same technical
tools that permit to establish these criminal networks allow to create new
procedures to detect them. Indeed, fraud detection is a current hot topic
appearing daily in the news, and this produces a high demand of theoretical
and practical mathematical instruments for fighting against fraud.
Since the mid-twentieth century, a consistent theoretical framework has
been developed from the social sciences. The most powerful approach from
this point of view seems to be the so called Fraud Triangle theory, that have
show to be useful also in applications (see for example [7, 17, 26]). This
theoretical framework makes it possible to understand that fraud has its
roots in psychological events determined by cultural structures and must
finally be understood as a sociological fact (see diagram below). Therefore,
social relations are those that make fraud processes visible, and can be for-
mally analyzed using appropriate models that have to use large amounts
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of information and relational mathematical tools ([18, 27]). Both are avail-
able today, so we are prepared to bring all these elements together to build
general theoretical developments as well as computational tools for fraud
detection.
FRAUD TRIANGLE:
Justification //
Motivation

Rationalization
Realization

Social pressure
Financial needs // Opportunity: FRAUD
The aim of this paper is to explain a new topological approach to under-
standing and detecting the processes of fraud. As we have already pointed
out, the big amount of information that the new technologies bring into the
scene have changed the way a scientist can understand the fraud as a math-
ematical phenomenon: invoices, emails, company registers, provide highly
meaningful information that may help the analyst to detect evidences of
fraud. The extraordinarily large set of data that accompanies any fraud
process makes necessary to change the usual analysis tools, traditionally
based on the study of the lawyers and the analysis of economists of re-
lated documents. New ways of understanding and new computing tools are
clearly needed, and the theoretical development of the associated mathemat-
ical models has to grow together. Therefore, our idea is to propose a new
model based on a topological graph approach to the analysis of networks.
Several mathematical theories have been already applied to fraud detec-
tion, involving quite different approaches: data science [19, 29, 33], game
theory [31], statistical analysis and machine learning [1, 20] and graph the-
ory [25] are some of them (see also [3, 22]). One of the most successful
theories has proven to be the graph-based analytical approach, which has
already given some programs for fraud detection, as Neo4j. In this paper
we propose a new technique for defining a model by means of quasi-pseudo-
metrics for complete graph structures. The vertices/nodes are the elements
that have to be analyzed: persons, entities, companies, invoices or emails,
for instance. Starting with a graph with edges among vertices having a finite
set of properties, we establish a way for defining a family of quasi-pseudo-
metrics for translating the graph to a topological space. To facilitate the
explanation of the model, we will simplify our ideas in this paper by assum-
ing some requirements to ensure that the final quasi-pseudo-metric is in fact
a metric. We will call such a structure a “metric graph”, and the topology
will be constructed using quasi-pseudo-metrics (see for example [16, 21] for
the basics). Once we can define neighborhoods of vertices, we use the topo-
logical properties to characterize the relevant elements of the space, that
have to become the main objects of the anti-fraud analysis. Besides the
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topological space, we need an additive set function acting in the class of all
subsets of the original set of nodes —a measure— for helping to evaluate the
“size” —given in terms of number of elements, weighted means, or similar
mathematical features— of the neighborhoods of the nodes. Together, both
tools (metric and measure) allow to define the fundamental object of our
model: the density of the family of neighborhoods of a given node.
The abstract main supporting idea of our model is that fraud can be
detected by searching for unusual concentration of mass phenomena in a
specifically defined topological graph. Broadly speaking, it can be estab-
lished in the following terms: the “map of density” of a graph should
follow an easy-to-recognize pattern. If no previous information on the pat-
tern is available, then the hypothesis must be that the relevant vertices —the
ones that must focus the attention of the anti-fraud analysts— are the ones
in which there is an anomalous density distribution. In other words, the
uniform density distribution is assumed as reference pattern. Small local
densities as well as big local densities should indicate a “hot node” in terms
of corruption, and would allow to classify the different schemes of fraud.
In this article —of mathematical nature— we firstly present the mathe-
matical structure, showing at each step examples that would help the reader
to follow the development of the model. The main ideas will be shown in the
central part of the paper. Some examples and applications are explained in
the final part.
Let us introduce some technical formal concepts. We use standard math-
ematical notation. We will construct our models by starting with a set Ω
of entities, that will be considered as the vertices of a complete graph. The
edges of the graph will be weighted for the definition of a metric in it. We
will write R+ for the set of non-negative real numbers. A quasi-pseudo-
metric on a set Ω ([16, 21]) is a function d : Ω×Ω→ R+ satisfying that for
a, b, c ∈ Ω,
(1) d(a, b) = 0 if a = b, and
(2) d(a, b) ≤ d(a, c) + d(c, b).
Such a function is enough for defining a topology by means of the basis
of neighborhoods that is given by the open balls. If ε > 0, we define the ball
of radius ε and center in a ∈ Ω as
Bε(a) :=
{
b ∈ Ω : d(a, b) < ε
}
.
Note that this topology is in fact given by the countable basis of neighbor-
hoods provided by the balls B1/n(x) = {y ∈ X : d(x, y) ≤ 1/n}, n ∈ N.
The resulting metrical/topological structure (Ω, d) is called a quasi-pseudo-
metric space.
If the function d is symmetric, that is, d(a, b) = d(b, a), then it is called a
pseudo-metric. If d can be used for separating points —that is, if d(a, b) =
0 = d(b, a) only in the case that a = b— but it is not necessarily sym-
metric, then it is called a quasi-metric. Finally, if both requirements hold
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—symmetry and separation—, d is called a metric (or a distance). In this
case, the topology generated by the balls is Hausdorff. These notions have
been already used in several applied contexts; let us mention for example
the design of semantic computational tools ([23, 28]) or the analysis of com-
plexity measures in theoretical computer science ([10, 11]).
2. Mathematical structures for detection of fraud in public
administration and business.
In this section we introduce the general framework for understanding the
fraud processes into a mathematical structure. Although our objective is to
construct a model based on metrics, our goal is to open the door to the pos-
sibility of applying reinforcement learning tools for fraud analysis. Several
researchers have recently used machine learning methods for financial fraud
detection (see [1, 30, 32]). Although we have used some ideas from these
documents and related ones (see also references in them), our techniques are
new, and we are not yet introducing these artificial intelligence tools into
this document. This task will be the next step in our research program.
As we said in the introduction, we will mix for our model a basic graph
structure together with some topological tools, that are introduced by means
of a quasi-pseudo-metric. In our formalism, in principle the graphs used are
assumed to be complete, but this is not a restriction: we can assign weights
to the edges, so we can “almost cancel” relationships by using very large
distances between vertices. Graph-based constructions have been already
used for fraud detection, although without the explicit introduction of metric
elements (see for example [2, 8, 15]). The way we introduce the metric and
its role in the model is our main contribution.
Let Ω be a set of objects of the same class related to the representation
of individuals of a system. Of course, there is a lot of different ways of
defining a metric in a set depending on the supplementary structure that
the set is assumed to have ([6]). Typically, the set of entities in our fraud
detection model is represented by vectors containing information of different
type, each class in each coordinate. A vector v in this class (belonging to
a subset Ω of a vector space V ) is univocally associated to an individual:
for example, the set Ω may be composed by invoices of a given year paid
by a public administration. Figure 1 shows an scheme of the graph with
Neo4j; although the graph represented there is not complete, it is assumed
to be complete for the computation of the distance. Each vector may be
given by the attributes of the invoice, for example, First coordinate= date of
payment, Second coordinate= total amount paid, Third coordinate= name
of the company, that is,
v =
(
date of payment, total amount paid, name of the company
)
.
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Figure 1. An example of a (non-complete) graph for the
analysis of invoices in a certain public administration.
Let us consider now a quasi-pseudo-metric d in the set Ω. The explanation
of different systematic procedures for defining it will be given in the next
section. In the model it has to represent the proximity of different elements
of Ω among them, and the definition has to make sense for measuring the
economic activity (or other kind of relevant activities) related to the process
that is being analyzed. For instance, in the previous example a reasonable
distance will be given by the following function. Let v = (x1, x2, x3) and
w = (y1, y2, y3) be elements of Ω. We define
d(v, w) = d1(x1, y1) + d2(x2, y2) + d3(x3, y3),
where d1(x1, y1) = |x1 − y1|, d2(x2, y2) = |x2 − y2| and d3(x3, y3) = 0 if
the invoices v and w were paid to the same company, and d3(x3, y3) = 1
otherwise. This clearly defines a distance.
Let us explain other example with some details.
Example 2.1. The set of objects Ω is defined by companies involved in
providing services to the public administration in a given year. Each of
them is represented by a vector defined by
• First coordinate= total amount paid to the company (in K Euros).
• Second coordinate= number of services provided by the company.
• Third coordinate= geographical location of the company (first coor-
dinate of the position vector).
• Fourth coordinate= geographical location of the company (second co-
ordinate of the position vector).
This set would be considered by the analyst an “adequate system”, in the
sense that it would contain enough information for detecting an anomalous
behavior. We identify each company with its representing vector, that is, Ω
is a subset of R4. We have to measure the distance among the elements that
are considered here. The first obvious choice is to measure the Euclidean
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distance among vectors, that is if v1, v2 ∈ Ω,
d(v1, v2) =
∥∥∥v1 − v2∥∥∥
2
,
where
∥∥·∥∥
2
denotes the Euclidean norm in R4. However, this option provides
an information that only allows to compare companies among them, and
grouping them by similarity of activity and location. A priori, it does not
seem to be useful for fraud detection.
A more subtle option would be the following. Consider the seminorms
pE(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
∥∥∥(x1, x2, 0, 0)∥∥∥
2
, v = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ R4,
and
pL(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
∥∥∥(0, 0, x3, x4)∥∥∥
2
, v = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ R4.
Both of them are seminorms, and so the formulas dE(v1, v2) = pE(v1−v2)
and dL(v1, v2) = pL(v1 − v2) define pseudo-metrics (d(v1, v2) = 0, does not
necessarily imply v1 = v2). The first one allows grouping companies by sim-
ilar economic activity —that is, a small neighborhood of a company/vector
v contains companies with similar economic relation with the public admin-
istration. Also, a big value of pE(v) in comparison with the values of pE of
other companies indicates a big economical activity, that would be an indica-
tion either of fraud or risk of fraud. The second one —dL— would be used
for detecting changes of names of the same company for hiding an unusual
recruitment with the public administration of a single company.
Let us define now two more structures. Consider the σ-algebra B of Borel
sets of (Ω, d) —typically, Ω will be a finite set and B will be the class 2Ω
of all the subsets of Ω—. Consider a Borel measure µ : B → R+. On the
other hand, consider also a function ψ : Ω × R+ → R+ that is increasing
with respect to the second variable. It will be considered as a radial weight
associated to the radius of the balls for the metric topology.
Definition 2.2. Let F (R+,R+) be the set of real non-negative functions
acting in the positive real numbers. We define the density function F as the
function-valued map
F : Ω× R+ → F (R+,R+)
given by
(a, ε) 7→ F(a, ε) = fa(ε) := µ(Bε(a))
ψ(a, ε)
.
Remark 2.3. Let us explain a —in a sense canonical— example of this
notion. Consider a finite set of companies Ω = Ω0 in the setting of Example
2.1. Take µ(·) = | · | to be the counting measure on the σ-algebra of all finite
subsets 2Ω0 , and ψ(a, ε) = ε4 for all a ∈ Ω0 —the power 4 for representing
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the magnitude of a “volume” in a space of 4-dimensions—. The metric d is
the one defined in the first part of this example. In this case,
F(a, ε) = fa(ε)
=
|Bε(a)|
ε4
=
1
ε4
×
(
number of companies in {b ∈ Ω : ‖b− a‖2 < ε}
)
.
This formula is clearly defining a density-type parameter: it is given by a
ratio among “number of things” in a given volume of the space and the “size”
of such volume.
We are prepared now to define the main concept of this paper.
Definition 2.4. Let r > 0. We define the concentration of mass (out of
a neighborhood of the element a of size r), or the local density around a, as
the function Cr : Ω→ R+ ∪+∞ given by
Cr(a) =
∫ +∞
r
fa(ε) dν(ε), a ∈ Ω,
where ν is (another countably additive) Borel measure on (0,∞).
For ν, we are thinking for example on a Dirac’s delta of a given value
ε0 > 0, or Lebesgue measure dε. Note that the requirement r > 0 is imposed
to assure the convergence of the integral, at least in the canonical case
explained in Remark 2.3. In the standard finite case, if d is a distance, it
can be taken as the minimum of all the pairwise distances in the set Ω not
being 0, assuring in this way that Br(a) contains just an element for any
a ∈ Ω.
The central methodological idea of the present paper is that fraud detec-
tion can be considered as a systematic procedure for finding “outliers” in a
quasi-pseudo-metric space. Indeed, fraud can be modeled as a concentration
of mass phenomenon: that is, elements a ∈ Ω are associated to processes
that are “suspicious of fraud” if Cr(a) has an unexpected value —that is, ei-
ther “too high” or “too low” when comparing with the mean value—. Each
of these deviations can be interpreted in different terms, providing different
figures of fraud.
It must be taken into account that special elements in the system may
have high values of Cr and this situation can be considered as “normal”:
for instance, if there is only one company providing a given service; or, the
name of the responsible of the public administration would appear in all the
invoices.
Although the way of measuring local density given in Definition 2.4 seems
to be the most adequate to the original problem, other ways of measuring
this magnitude would make sense. For instance, for the discrete case we can
compute the supremum of the size of the balls r for which the ball contains
only its center a, that is
rmax(a) := sup{r > 0 : |Br(a)| = 1},
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that coincides with the minimum distance to the closer element of the space,
that is
rmax(a) = min{d(a, b) : b ∈ Ω, b 6= a}.
Note that in this case, a big value of rmax means small density.
In the examples in this section it has been used the Euclidean norm in
the finite dimensional spaces for constructing the underlying topological
structure. This way of measuring the distances is easy and provides directly
a metric in the set Ω. However, this is not the best option in general, and
an alternate method for defining metric structures is required. The reason
is that often the indexes that are naturally used for indicating the distance
among elements of Ω are not metrics; in fact, they are not quasi-pseudo-
metrics. Let us explain this relevant point with an example.
Suppose that Ω is a set of person in a social net, and we have a function
φ that “measures” the “level of familiarity” among the elements of Ω in
the following way: φ(a, b) = 1 if a an b are close friends, φ(a, b) = 2 if a
an b are friends but they meet occasionally, φ(a, b) = 3 if a an b are just
acquaintances, and φ(a, b) = 4 if a an b never met. It may clearly happen
that a is a close friend of b, b is a close friend of c, but a and c are only
acquaintances; that is
3 = φ(a, c) > φ(a, b) + φ(b, c) = 1 + 1,
and so the triangular inequality does not hold. This means that φ is not a
quasi-pseudo-metric, but a natural function for measuring social distances.
We will solve this problem by defining a general rule for generation of
quasi-pseudo-distances by means of the notion of proximity function, that
will be introduced in the next section. As we will see there, the function φ
above is a canonical example of such a proximity function.
3. The general scheme of graph quasi-pseudo-metrics for
fraud detection
Distances have often been used for graph analysis in different contexts
where graph theory is applied. However, this use is made for comparison
between graphs, sometimes also for fraud detection. Metrics are defined to
measure the distance between two graphs, not to measure distances between
vertices within a given graph (see for example [4, 5, 9]). In this section we
are interested in defining a general procedure for analyzing relations inside a
graph Ω defined by “entities” (including for example persons or companies)
using the information appearing in text documents, considering that as sets
of emails, contracts, invoices and so. The way of doing this is to construct a
distance in the graph by means of these elements. Since the very beginning
of the modern graph theory, the introduction of a metric in the graph for
studying its properties has been used as a relevant tool [13, 14]. In our
case, the design of the metric is directly related to the application of the
model for fraud detection. Some concrete models based on similar ideas
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have been recently published for particulars aspects of fraud detection, as
financial reporting fraud [12].
Our method follows the next steps.
1) Detection and definition of a non-ambiguous set of entities for start-
ing the analysis. For doing this, the analyst has to choose it, and a
specific setting should be performed for a fixed kind of fraud. Au-
tomatic processes can also be used: for example, semantic parsing
techniques provided by the Stanford group could be applied as well
as neural networks for training the searching system (see the refer-
ences for example [24]).
2) Definition of the matrix associated to a proximity function. This
is a function φ : Ω × Ω → R+ that describes by means of a non-
negative real number a relation among the entity a and the entity
b, both of them in Ω, which represent how far the individuals —
“entities”— are connected as elements of the network concerning
the economical/administrative activities. A small value of φ(a, b)
means that both a and b can be often found as parts of the same
activity/business; a big one, that there is not such a relation. Al-
though the function is supposed to be bounded (typically, by 1), it
is not assumed to be a distance. However, it may be assumed to be
symmetric and φ(a, b) = 0 if and only if a = b, and so it only fails
subadditivity for being a metric; such functions are sometimes called
semimetrics.
3) Definition of a distance on the set Ω by using a “triangular gauge”
for φ, that is, a new function d : Ω× Ω→ R+ that satisfies that
a) it is a metric,
b) and for all a, b ∈ Ω, d(a, b) ≤ φ(a, b).
Of course, for this to be true we need a proximity function φ that
is symmetric and separates points. In particular, d(a, b) = 0 if and
only if a = b.
We will explain later on how to define explicitly such a function
d given a function φ. In fact, the method that we propose is the
main contribution of the present work, and has been performed in
a specific way for solving the problem that we explained above and
we originally faced.
3.1. The triangular gauge of a proximity function φ. For the con-
struction of such a gauge, given a function φ with the requirements explained
above we use a path-distance-like definition by considering a path distance in
the global graph Ω, in which all the vertices are assumed to be connected —a
complete graph—. We analyze the properties of such a metric, and several
procedures for defining the initial proximity matrix (φ(a, b))(a,b)∈Ω×Ω.
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In Section 15.1 in [6, p.276], a weighted path metric for a connected graph
is defined as follows. If e is an edge of the graph, write w(e) for the value
of a positive weight; w is so assumed to be a (real positive) function acting
in the set of edges of the graph. The path distance dG among to vertices a
and b of the graph is given by
dG(a, b) := inf
{ ∑
ei∈P
w(ei)
}
,
where the infimum is computed over all paths P = {ei : i ∈ IP } that allow
to go from a to b.
We are interested in a construction that is similar to (but not equal to)
a weighted path metric defined on the set of all the vertices of a connected
graph. In our case all couples of elements of the set are assumed to be
directly connected by an edge, that is, the graph is complete. Consider a
non-increasing sequence W := (Wi)
∞
i=1 of positive real numbers, all of them
less or equal to one. Given two points a, b ∈ Ω, we define a function acting
in Ω× Ω by
dφ(a, b) = inf
{
W1φ(a, b), inf
{
W2
(
φ(a, c) + φ(c, b)
)
: a 6= c 6= b, c ∈ Ω
}
, ...
..., inf
{
Wn
(
φ(a, c1)+
n−2∑
i=1
φ(ci, ci+1)+φ(cn−1, b)
)
, a 6= c1, ci 6= ci+1, cn−1 6= b
}
, ...
}
.
A simple calculation shows the next result.
Proposition 3.1. The function dφ(a, b) defined above is a pseudo-metric
on Ω. Moreover, if Ω is finite and there is a constant Q > 0 such that
1/i ≤ QWi for i = 1, ...,∞, then dφ is a metric.
Proof. A simple look to the formula shows that dφ is symmetric due to the
symmetry of φ. Let us show the triangular inequality. Take a, b, c ∈ Ω and
fix ε > 0. Suppose that the infimum in dφ(a, b) and dφ(b, c) is attained ”up
to ε > 0” for
Wn0
(
φ(a, c1) +
n0−2∑
i=1
φ(ci, ci+1) + φ(cn−1, b)
)
, a 6= c1, ci 6= ci+1, cn0−1 6= b
and
Wn1
(
φ(b, c′1) +
n1−2∑
i=1
φ(c′i, c
′
i+1) + φ(cn−1, c)
)
, b 6= c′1, c′i 6= c′i+1, c′n1−1 6= c,
respectively. Now take n2 = n0 + n1 − 1 and the sequence a, c1, ..., cn0−1, b,
c′1, ..., c′n1−1, c, that satisfies the requirement that each element is different
from the previous one. It contains n2 elements, and so using the fact that
Wn2 ≤ min{Wn0 ,Wn1}
we have that
dφ(a, c) ≤ dφ(a, b) + dφ(b, c) + 2ε.
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Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we get that dφ satisfies the triangular inequality.
For the second statement, just note that, since Ω is finite and φ separates
points, we have that there is a constant k such that
0 < k < φ(a, b) for all (a, b) ∈ Ω× Ω.
Therefore, if a 6= b we have
dφ(a, b) ≥ inf{k ·Wi · i : i ∈ N} ≥ k
Q
> 0.
This proves that dφ is indeed a metric.

In what follows we will use the particular case given by the weights se-
quence W = (1/i)∞i=1, and so the distance function is defined by
dφ(a, b) = inf
{
φ(a, b), inf
{φ(a, c) + φ(c, b)
2
: a 6= c 6= b
}
,
inf
{φ(a, c1) + φ(c1, c2) + φ(c2, b)
3
: a 6= c1 6= c2 6= b
}
,
..., inf
{φ(a, c1) +∑n−2i=1 φ(ci, ci+1) + φ(cn−1, b)
n
, a 6= c1, ci 6= ci+1, cn−1 6= b
}
...
}
.
Note that for computing this infimum we have to deal with an infinite
set of numbers. However, if |Ω| is finite we can approximate the distance
by restricting the previous formula to the first n terms appearing in the
infimum —approximation of order n—. The following scheme shows the
procedure to define an approximation of order 2 to the metric matrix of the
model using the formula above.
Algorithm 1 Computation of the order 2 approximation Dφ(2) to the met-
ric for the graph of the fraud model.
1: Fix a set Ω = {a : a is an entity in the fraud model} 6= ∅.
Require: 2 ≤ |Ω| <∞
2: while ak ∈ Ω do
3: For i ∈ {1, · · · , |Ω|}, compute aki = φ(ak, ai) ∈ R+.
4: Define Φk = (φ(ak, ai))i.
5: D(1)φ(ak, ai)← φ(ak, ai).
6: D(2)φ(ak, ai)← min
{φ(ak,al)+φ(al,ai)
2 : al ∈ Ω
}
.
7: d(2)φ(ak, ai)← min{D(1)φ(ak, ai), D(2)φ(ak, ai)}.
8: Define Dk(2) = (d(2)φ(ak, ai))i.
9: end while
10: Define D(2) = (Dk(2))k.
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Suppose that the set Ω is finite, |Ω| = n ∈ N. Then we can represent φ
by means of the matrix of its range, that is,
Φ =
φ(a1, a1) · · · φ(a1, an)... . . . ...
φ(a1, an) · · · φ(an, an)
 =
 0 · · · φ(a1, an)... . . . ...
φ(a1, an) · · · 0
 .
We will call the matrix Φ the proximity matrix associated to φ.
Example 3.2. Let us give some examples of proximity matrices.
1) The first easy example is given by the metric defined in Example 2.1.
In this case, the proximity function is just the Euclidean metric; that
is, φ = d. Consequently, the corresponding proximity matrix Φ is a
metric matrix.
2) Let us show two examples of such construction that are not defined
as in Example 2.1. For the first one, consider Ω to be a group of
individuals that are involved in a business, and the only information
we have about it is written in a set M of documents (see Figure 2).
We want to design an analysis of the influence of the individuals in
Ω in the business. In order to do this and as a first approximation,
we consider the following proximity function.
Given a, b ∈ Ω, take the number of times Ma,b that a appears
together with b in a document. Define
φM (a, b) =
M −Ma,b
M
, a, b ∈ Ω.
Another step is needed to clean the matrix in case there are two dif-
ferent individuals in Ω such that they coincide in all the documents.
In this case, they must be considered just as only one vertex of the
corresponding complete graph. Note also that Ma,b = 1 indicates
that a and b are not appearing together in any document. However,
this does not mean that the distance among them has necessarily the
maximum value. The reason is that it may happen that a appears
in a document with c, and c with b. Using an adequate formula for
dφ —for example the one given by the weights Wi = 1/i as in the
particular case given above—, we can easily see that dφM (a, b) < 1.
3) Let us show now a different way of defining a proximity function
for the same problem. Let N = |Ω| and assume that there are M
documents. Take the N ×M -matrix C of all the counts C(a,m) of
the times that the individual a appears in document m. Normalize
all the vectors appearing in the rows and compute A = C · CT . It is
an N ×N -matrix giving the “cosine” between elements of Ω. If the
element A(a, b) is near to one, this means that they appear in almost
the same documents; if it is near to 0, it means that they are not
appearing together.
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Take the N×N -matrix IN×N in which all the coefficients are equal
to 1, and compute Φ as
Φ = IN×N −A.
It gives a different proximity matrix. Actually, this construction is
the one that we will consider as standard, and will be developed with
some detail in the next section. As we will show there, it can be
interesting to combine different metrics, some/all of them defined by
proximity functions.
Figure 2. “Hidden” representation of a model for fraud de-
tection with no explicit labels for identifying the entities in-
volved (Neo4j).
3.2. Proximity functions defined by means of correlation matrices:
the standard model. Let us fix a canonical version of the formulae ex-
plained in the previous parts of this section. It follows the lines of Example
3.2, 3).
A. Take a set of N entities Ω and a set of M properties —quantifiable
by means of positive real numbers— associated to each element a ∈
Ω. Construct the set of N vectors va each of them containing the
numerical value of the properties of a fixed a ∈ Ω.
B. Take the matrix C defined in a way that each row is such a vector
va after normalization, that is va/‖va‖2 (we use the Euclidean norm
for normalizing).
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C. Consider the correlation matrix A = C · CT and take as proximity
matrix Φ = IN×N −A. Note that it is symmetric.
D. Define the pseudo-metric dφ.
E. The final distance for performing the analysis is given by the formula
d(a, b) = k · ‖va − vb‖2
max{‖vc‖2 : c ∈ Ω} + dφ(a, b), a, b ∈ Ω.
Here, k > 0 is a parameter for balancing both components of the
distance. The first one allows to measure the size of the vectors, for
detecting the case that one of its values has unexpected values (for
example, a big ammount of money appearing in any coordinate of
va). The second one provides information about the coincidence of
coordinates, measuring it using the “cosine distance”.
Let us explain a complete example using this method.
Example 3.3. Consider 4 companies, ai, i = 1, ..., 4, which have been hired
by a public administration (PA) for doing similar services. We are interested
in analyzing if there is any irregular behavior in any of them in 2017. We
will show two problems and the models that correspond to each of them. We
only have information regarding total amount of money that PA paid to each
of them in 2017 and the number of contracts with each company.
(1) Suppose that we want to analyze if the total amount of money xi, i =
1, ..., 4, got by each company ai is either equally distributed among
all the companies or we can find different patterns regarding that
to divide the companies in two groups. Let us use the procedure
explained above. The “vector of properties” vi for each company ai
contains just a coordinate, xi. The values (in thousands of euros)
are x1 = 4, x2 = 2, x3 = 2, and x4 = 1. The “Euclidean part” of
the pseudo-distance is then given by
dE(ai, aj) := |xi − xj |/max{4, 2, 1} = |xi − xj |/4, i, j = 1, ..., 4.
The part of the pseudo-metric given by the correlation matrix is given
(after normalization) by the trivial formula
I−A = I− C · CT = I−

1
1
1
1
 · [1 1 1 1] =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 .
Thus, the final pseudo-metric contains only the Euclidean compo-
nent, and is represented by the matrix
d = dE =

0 1/2 1/2 3/4
1/2 0 0 1/4
1/2 0 0 1/4
3/4 1/4 1/4 0
 .
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This pseudo-metric allow to separate the set of the four companies
in two disjoint balls; indeed, for example for ε = 3/8, we have
B3/8(a1) = {a1}, and B3/8(a2) = {a2, a3, a4}.
The local density in both companies, computed as the ratio among
the number of elements in each ball and the radius of the —one
dimensional— balls give the values for ε = 3/8,
Density3/8(a1) = |B3/8(a1)|/(3/8) = 8/3
and
Density3/8(a2) = |B3/8(a2)|/(3/8) = 8
= Density3/8(a3) = Density3/8(a4).
Therefore, it can be easily seen that there is a concentration of mass
around a2, and a1 is surrounded by an area of low density. In this
sense, it can be established that a1 is an isolated point in terms of
density, so it is suspicious of receiving an special treatment from PA.
Of course, this fits with the fact that a1 got the biggest amount of
money in the contracts among all companies, and the difference with
the other ones seems to be meaningful.
(2) Suppose now that we want to analyze a different aspect of the same
problem, and we include in the investigation the number of contracts
of each of the companies with PA in 2017 given the total amounts
of money presented in (1). Now we consider two properties —two-
coordinates vectors— for each company: the first coordinate is the
amount of money in (1), and the second one if the number of con-
tracts. We have the following values: a1 = (4, 3), a2 = (2, 1),
a3 = (2, 2), and a4 = (1, 1). For the aim of simplicity, we identify
the companies ai with its two-coordinates property vectors (xi, yi),
i, j = 1, ..., 4.
As in the previous case, we have that the Euclidean part of the
distance is given by the Euclidean norm divided by the maximum of
the norms, that is, taking into account that
‖a1‖ = 5, ‖a2‖ =
√
5, ‖a3‖ = 2
√
2, ‖a4‖ =
√
2,
we get
dE(ai, aj) = ‖(xi, yi)− (xj , yj)‖2/max{‖ai‖2} = ‖(xi, yi)− (xj , yj)‖2
5
.
This gives the metric matrix
DE =

0 2
√
2
5
√
5
5
√
13
5
2
√
2
5 0
1
5
1
5√
5
5
1
5 0
√
2
5√
13
5
1
5
√
2
5 0
 ∼

0 0.566 0.447 0.721
0.566 0 0.2 0.2
0.447 0.2 0 0.283
0.721 0.2 0.283 0
 .
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On the other hand, the proximity matrix given by the correlation
matrix is in this case meaningful. Indeed,
I−A = I− C · CT
= I−

4
5
3
5
2√
5
1√
5
1√
2
1√
2
1√
2
1√
2
 ·
[
4
5
2√
5
1√
2
1√
2
3
5
1√
5
1√
2
1√
2
]
∼

0 0.016 0.010 0.010
0.016 0 0.051 0.051
0.01 0.051 0 0
0.01 0.051 0 0
 .
This is not a pseudo-metric matrix: note for example that
0.051 = φ(a2, a3) > φ(a2, a1) + φ(a1, a3) = 0.016 + 0.010.
In order to provide a pseudo-metric dφ preserving as much as possible
the size of the coefficients of the original proximity matrix, we use
the formula given in Section 3.1 with all weights equal to one, that
is Wi = 1, i = 1, ..., 4. We obtain the pseudo-metric matrix
dφ ∼

0 0.016 0.010 0.010
0.016 0 0.026 0.026
0.01 0.026 0 0
0.01 0.026 0 0
 .
The final distance matrix is then given by
D = λDE + dφ.
This can be used for the analysis in the same way that was made in
(1). However, if we look at the two matrices separately, we get more
information about the problem.
(i) Using dE, we find again a similar conclusion as the one we got
in (1): the first company is the only element in the ball of radius
ε = 0.4. However, a ball of the same size ε = 0.4 centered in
a2 contains the rest of the elements, a2, a3 and a4. The same
argument that was used in (1) using Density0.4 provides the
same conclusion as in (1).
(ii) The second matrix —associated to dφ— centers the attention
in other element. In this case, the ball B0.015(a2) only contains
a2. However, the ball B0.015(a1) contains a1, a3 and a4. The
density around a2 is then smaller than density around a1, a3
and a4. This means that a2 would be suspicious of getting a
special treatment, or at least that its hiring pattern is not the
same. Note that this pseudo-metric measures the proportion be-
tween amount of money and number of contracts. The result
shows that the company a2 is not following the same propor-
tion, what means that the money associated to each contract is
different. This may be just by chance, but also would indicate
that there is someone interested in manipulating the standard
hiring procedure, and so it would be suspicious of fraud.
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4. Final remarks: applications of the model to detect
irregular behavior of elements in a network
In this section, and to finish the paper, we give some open ideas for apply-
ing the tools that we have shown. We can consider the following problems,
which could be solved by applying our metric graph structure.
• The first and canonical one: given an entity a ∈ Ω, find the rest of
the elements of Ω that are near (distance less than ε > 0). This is
the first step of the neighborhood analysis that allow to compute a
density map for searching anomalous behaviors. But it also gives a
primary information, providing the entities that are close to a given
one a with respect to the criterium used for the construction of the
proximity function.
• Degree of dependence of the “graph distance” on a single element
a ∈ Ω: this is the norm of the difference of the submatrix Da that is
obtained by eliminating the row and column associated to a in the
distance matrix D, and the distance matrix D(−a) that is computed
when the set considered is Ω \ {a} instead of Ω. If the value is small,
this means that the element a is not relevant for the graph, it is not
really connected or it is not giving easy paths for other entities to
be connected.
• Optimization: given a vertex a ∈ Ω and a subset S ⊂ Ω, find the
element(s) b in S such that dφ(a, b) attains its minimum.
• A singular-values-type method for determining the classes of equiva-
lence of entities in the space having the same behavior, in the sense
that they appear in the same documents. We use the matrix A
defined in Example 3.2, 3). Consider the individuals a1 to an and
suppose they are appearing in the same documents, and they are
the only ones appearing in these documents. Then we can write the
vectors of the matrix A corresponding to these individuals as
1/
√
n (1, 1, ..., 1, 0, ...0),
where the coefficient equal to 1 appears in the n first positions. On
the other hand, the other individuals have coefficients that are all of
them 0 in the first n positions (check that, this is a consequence of the
construction of A based in the fact that they are appearing in disjoint
documents). When the corresponding submatrix is diagonalized, we
obtain an eigenvalue that is not zero and other one that is 0, that has
multiplicity n− 1. Therefore, there is only one document-appearing
behavior, the rest only repeat the behavior of the first individual.
Of course, we rarely are going to find this pure behavior, and so we
use the ideas of the singular values method for giving the “almost
zero” version.
For doing this, compute the eigenvalues of the matrix {λi : 1 ≤
i ≤ m}. Fix ε > 0, and take the subspace Sε generated by the
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eigenvectors associated to the eigenvalues λi < ε. Write the equation
A = UT∆U (U is the matrix of change of basis) and compute the
vectors va = (0, · · · , 1, · · · 0) representing the elements a ∈ Ω that
satisfy that Uva is in Sε. This is the set that can be eliminated from
the original set Ω, since they have an equivalent behavior that any
of the ones for which λi ≥ ε.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a new framework for constructing decision support
systems for financial anti-fraud analysis. It consists of a graph structure Ω
together with a distance defined on it, that models the relations among the
entities involved in the analysis. We have shown how to define these metrics
by means of examples and applications.
Our main methodological hypothesis has also been established. Together
with the metric structure, a measure acting in the σ-algebra generated by Ω
is considered in order to define a function that allows to measure the density
of the neighborhoods of the elements of the model. Our main axiom claims
that a (group of) entity(ies) is suspected of committing fraud whenever there
is an anomalous density –meaningfully bigger or smaller than the mean—
in his neighborhood. Concrete models and examples for explaining this idea
are presented.
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